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We present DiffSum, a simple risk-limiting post-
election ballot-polling audit. See [3, 2, 1] for background.
You wish to check that candidate A really won a plu-
rality election against candidate B. You may sample the
n cast paper ballots without replacement.
Procedure DiffSum:
1. [Choose c] Let d be the number of dec-
imal digits in n, and choose c = d + δ
where δ controls the error rate (the chance
of the audit accepting an incorrect outcome):
δ 0 1 2 3 4
max error rate 22% 15% 10% 6% 4%
2. [Begin] Draw an initial sample of 24 ballots.
3. [Tally] Determine the number a of votes for A
in your sample, and the number b of votes for B.
4. [Stop?] Stop the audit (accept A as winner) if
a > b and
(a− b)2 > c · (a+ b) . (1)
5. [Continue?] If a + b = n, stop (you have just
completed a full recount). Otherwise, enlarge
your random sample and return to step 3.
Remarks: The initial size 24 of the sample in step 2 is
arbitrary. In step 5 the increase in sample size is also
arbitrary; it could be by a single ballot.
The name “DiffSum” was chosen because (1) says
(difference)2 > c · (sum) . (2)
Efficiency: Let m be the true margin (the fraction of
votes cast for A minus the fraction cast for B). In a
sample of size s = a+b, the expected value of a−b is sm.
Thus, DiffSum is expected to stop when (sm)2 > cs or
s > c/m2 (3)
DiffSum is approximately as efficient as Bravo—
compare (3) with the estimate 2 ln(1/α)/m2 for
Bravo [2] (here α is the risk limit). Moreover,DiffSum
does not need an initial estimate of the vote shares, and
Bravo is inefficient when this estimate is inaccurate.
Error rate: The error rate bounds given in Step 1 are
based on extensive simulations for δ = 0 to 4, d = 3 to 7,
n = 10d, and c = d+δ. We measured the error rate over
10,000 simulated elections in each case. Each simulation
estimated the error rate when the election was a tie,
a worst-case scenario; with more realistic margins the
error rate drops dramatically, so that in practice even
c = d should give very reliable audits.
Example: An election with n = 50, 000 votes can be
audited using c = 7 for a risk limit of α = 10%. Form =
0.20, DiffSum examines about 175 ballots (estimated),
Bravo (with α = 0.10) examines about 115 (estimated).
In simulations for this election, DiffSum with c = 7
examines about 157 ballots on average, and has an error
rate of less than 0.04%; DiffSum with c = 5 examines
about 112 ballots on average, and has an error rate of
less than 0.2%. Bravo examines about 119 ballots on
average, and has an error rate of approximately 2.5%.
Extension: In practice, one should cease random sam-
pling once a significant number (say 4%) of the ballots
have been sampled, when switching over to a full hand
recount becomes more economical.
With more candidates, let DiffSum check that the
sample winner beats the sample’s strongest loser.
Conclusion: DiffSum is exceptionally simple, and ap-
pears quite comparable to Bravo in terms of efficiency
and error rate. Further simulations and analysis would
be helpful.
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